Árpád Hornyák, Hungarian-Yugoslav Diplomatic Relations, 1918–1927. Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, Wayne, New Jersey: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, pp. x + 426. by Bakić, Dragan
Balcanica XLIV (2013)438
Árpád Hornyák, Hungarian-yugoslav diplomatiC relations, 1918–1927. 
Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Monographs, Wayne, New Jersey: 
Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2013, pp. x + 426.
Reviewed by Dragan Bakić*
study (the organisations such as Awak-
ening Hungarians) – and the danger of 
a Habsburg restoration cemented the 
solidarity among Yugoslavia, Czechoslo-
vakia and Romania that eventually took 
the form of the Little Entente alliance. 
The unsettled situation in Danubian 
Europe was further aggravated by differ-
ent and mutually competitive designs of 
Great Powers, most notably France and 
Italy. The two failed attempts of the ex-
Emperor Charles IV to regain the Crown 
of St. Stephen nearly led to an armed 
confrontation between the Little Entente 
and Hungary, and thus demonstrated the 
fragility of peace on the Danube.
Hornyák’s analysis of the foreign pol-
icy of Hungarian Prime Minister, Count 
István Bethlen, who remained in office for 
ten years (1921–1931), after a series of un-
stable and short-lived cabinets, is rather lu-
cid. The author explains that Bethlen drew 
on the experience of his native Transylva-
nia, which had once survived as a princi-
pality by balancing between the Habsburg 
and Ottoman Empires. He realised that 
the weak post-war Hungary had to pursue 
a more moderate policy than that of his 
predecessors. Rather than defying all of its 
neighbours, it had to focus on internal sta-
bilisation of the country and achieve a set 
of clearly defined objectives which would 
greatly improve Hungary’s standing and 
create more favourable conditions for the 
ultimate goal that remained the same for 
Bethlen as for anyone else – the restora-
tion of historic lands of the Crown of St. 
Stephen. Bethlen and his supporters thus 
opposed those professional diplomats from 
This book analysis Yugo-Hungarian rela-
tions from the end of the First World War 
until the conclusion of the Italo-Hun-
garian friendship agreement of 5 April 
1927 which truly marked the end of a 
distinct phase in those relations. Its great-
est strength lies in the impressive range 
of both Hungarian and Yugoslav primary 
sources and literature on which it is based 
– it is certainly unrivalled in this respect. 
This reviewer was rather surprised to 
learn from Hornyák’s bibliographic essay 
that Hungarian primary material depos-
ited in the Hungarian National Archives 
concerning Hungarian foreign policy af-
ter the First World War is less preserved 
than the corresponding documents held 
in the Archives of Yugoslavia – given the 
vast destruction that Yugoslav material 
suffered during the Second World War. 
Hornyák presents an excellent ac-
count of the chaotic and dramatic situ-
ation in which the defeated Hungary 
found itself in 1918 and the attempts, 
invariably abortive, to extricate itself from 
the dismemberment pinning all hopes, 
at least initially, on the Peace Confer-
ence. Relations between Hungary and the 
newly-created Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-
ats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) unfolded 
within the framework of the emerging 
new European order. From the demarca-
tion line established by the Belgrade Mil-
itary Convention until the signing of the 
Trianon Treaty it took a year and a half 
for the borders between the two neigh-
bouring countries to finally take shape. 
The conclusion of the peace treaty did not 
pacify the relations between them. Hun-
garian irredentism – which, incidentally, 
does not receive much attention in this * Institute for Balkan Studies, Belgrade
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the Imperial Ballhausplatz who argued 
that Hungary should wait for Germany’s 
recovery and the changed constellation 
of power to pursue a more active policy 
(p. 259). The former’s clearly defined and 
realistic objectives included Hungary’s ad-
mission to the League of Nations, floata-
tion of a loan for economic reconstruction 
and the liquidation of military supervision, 
all of which were attained by Bethlen. For 
quite some time, one of the objectives was 
to seek for a rapprochement with Yugosla-
via, albeit for tactical reasons alone. It was 
bound to remain elusive as the difference 
between the two countries was irreconcil-
able. As Hornyák clearly points out, Hun-
gary needed an agreement with Belgrade 
in order to drive a wedge between the Lit-
tle Entente countries, whereas Yugoslavia 
was determined not to allow splitting up 
from her allies. 
On the other hand, the author’s ac-
count of Yugoslav foreign policy is less 
satisfactory. He makes some erroneous 
assumptions and, based on them, jumps 
to conclusions which can hardly be sup-
ported by the available evidence. For 
example, it is professed that during “the 
Peace Conference it was the Yugoslav 
delegation that protested most vigorous-
ly against the establishment of Albania as 
an independent country” (p. 133). Quite 
the contrary, the Yugoslavs plumped for 
the independence of Albania in her 1913 
frontiers as sketched by the London 
Conference after the First Balkan War, 
under the slogan “the Balkans for the 
Balkan peoples”. Only if the Great Pow-
ers had rendered that independence im-
possible to achieve, the delegates would 
have fallen back on a reserve policy – the 
absorption of the northern parts as far 
as the Drin River in order to gain the 
strategically more viable border.1 More-
1 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, eds. Lju-
bodrag Dimić and Djordje Borozan, 2 
vols. (Belgrade 1998), I, No. 822, From the 
over, Yugoslavia did not consider the Al-
banian problem with a view to an “open 
access to the Adriatic” as she had already 
possessed the wide Dalmatian littoral (p. 
134). And any reluctance that Belgrade 
might have had to come to terms with 
Hungary had nothing to do with Italian 
economic and political penetration into 
Albania. From the strategic point of view 
the Yugoslavs were frightened of the peril 
of Italians “joining hands” from Albania 
with the Bulgarians across the Vardar 
valley in Serb Macedonia, thus cutting 
off the vital Belgrade–Salonica railway in 
the same fashion the Bulgarian army had 
actually done in 1915.2 It was mainly this 
consideration that prompted Belgrade to 
memoir submitted to the Peace Conference 
at Paris in relation to revendications of the 
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
undated; No. 874, The Serbo-Croato-Slov-
ene state and Albania [memorandum in 
English], 6 September 1919; No. 932, Pašić 
to Davidović, 13 September 1919; No. 933, 
Delegation to Clemenceau, 17 September 
1919; No. 964, Record of the Delegation’s 
meeting of 17 December 1919; No. 968, 
Pašić to Davidović, 23 December 1919; No. 
972, Memorandum on Albania submitted 
to Wilson [American President], undated; 
Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, II, No. 12, 
The position of the Yugoslav Delegation in 
relation to the memorandum of 9 Decem-
ber 1919, 8 January 1920; No. 17, The record 
of the Cabinet meeting, 11 January 1920; 
No. 86, Delegation to Clemenceau, 9 Janu-
ary 1920; No. 108, Pašić to Protić, 21 March 
1920; No. 114, Memorandum submitted to 
the American Embassy at Paris, 29 March 
1920 [the interpretation concerning the 
frontier rectifications given by Radović con-
tradicts the content of the document]; No. 
129, The current position of the Adriatic 
question written by Otokar Ribarž, 13 May 
1920.         
2 Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, II, No. 14, 
Dr Trumbić’s [Foreign Minister] expose at 
the meeting of the allied Prime Ministers 
on 10 and 12 January 1920.
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support Albania’s independence. It was 
not the Yugoslav Minister in Tirana, 
Branko Lazarević, but Military Attaché, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tanasije Dinić, that 
reported to the Great General Staff in 
May 1926 that Ahmed Zogu had defi-
nitely transferred his and his country’s 
allegiance to Italy in return for generous 
financial support (p. 375, n. 44).3 In fact, 
Dinić vehemently argued that Lazarević 
was causing an immense damage to Yu-
goslav interests through his unrelenting 
support of Zogu’s regime and requested 
to be removed from his post if there was 
no change at the head of the Legation.4 
Later on, Hornyák revisits his argument 
that Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in 
1924–26 were but a function of the vac-
illations that characterised the relations 
between Rome and Belgrade and the 
attendant – but not specified – failures 
of King Alexander’s Balkan policy (pp. 
228–229). In doing so, he entirely over-
looks the fundamental premise of Yugo-
slavia’s conduct of external affairs: the 
Little Entente’s main value to Yugoslavs 
was that it allowed them to focus on the 
Balkans and Italian danger by protecting 
them from the north. Italy was no doubt 
a bogey that endeavoured to besiege Yu-
goslavia both from the direction of Cen-
tral Europe and in the Balkans but not 
to the point of depriving her of any dip-
lomatic initiative. Otherwise, she would 
not have been capable of conducting any 
active policy that Hornyák mentions.
The author is also mistaken in as-
suming that Belgrade did not earnestly 
believe that Hungarian breaches of the 
3 Belgrade, Vojni arhiv [The Military Ar-
chives], registry 17, box 95b, fascicle 1, doc. 
4, Dinić to Great General Staff, 25 May 
1926.
4 Živko Avramovski, “Akcija jugoslovenske 
vlade protiv Zoguovog režima u Albaniji 
preko Cena-bega Kryeziu, 1926–1927”, 
Albanološka istraživanja 2 (1965), 235–238.
restrictive military clauses of the Trianon 
Peace Treaty were substantial and con-
stituted a real threat to Hungary’s neigh-
bours (p. 137). However, it was not just 
the Hungarian irredentist organisations 
and the suspicion of disarmament’s be-
ing effectively carried out that accounted 
for Yugoslavia’s firm opposition to Hun-
gary’s adherence to the League of Na-
tions or, for that matter, the floatation of 
a loan for economic reconstruction. The 
Yugoslav Minister in Budapest, Milan 
Milojević, dismissed the prospect of es-
tablishing closer and more loyal relations 
with the Hungarians whose government, 
he was adamant, did not want any rap-
prochement as it was intent on the resto-
ration of Great Hungary.5 Milojević thus 
found that Hungary remained a serious 
adversary and advised his government 
accordingly: “The weaker she is eco-
nomically, the less [of an adversary] she 
would be.”6 His views also chimed with 
those held in the Yugoslav Foreign Min-
istry at large. The account of Yugoslavia’s 
role in the Chanak crises of September 
1922 (pp. 153–154) is also somewhat 
problematic. Belgrade was certainly not 
willing to side with France against Great 
Britain regardless of a loan for arms pur-
chase. It was rather anxious that such a 
conflict might bring about an overt rup-
ture between the two Allies and force the 
smaller states to take sides, a contingen-
cy that spelled uncertain prospects for 
the future. Most importantly, Belgrade 
could not afford to resort to military ac-
5 Belgrade, Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives 
of Yugoslavia (AJ)], London Legation, 
Milojević to Ninčić, 26 August 1923, confid. 
no. 1374; his experience of Hungary at that 
time the Yugoslav Minister described in his 
autobiography Milan Milojević, Balkanska 
ravnoteža (Belgrade: Signature, 1994), 186–
188 and 192–206.   
6 AJ, London Legation, Milojević to Ninčić, 
26 August 1923, confid. no. 1374.
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tion on a larger scale in order to support 
the British in their confrontation with 
the Turks when no tangible Yugoslav in-
terests were involved. 
The chapters dealing with the plans 
to materialise a “Central European” 
and “Balkan Locarno” on British initia-
tive are least satisfactory and contain a 
number of inaccuracies. These stem from 
the fact that the prominent role of Sir 
Austen Chamberlain and the British 
Foreign Office is examined on the ba-
sis of Hungarian and Yugoslav material 
rather than British primary sources.7 For 
that reason, some major points are either 
distorted or not clear. To begin with, it 
is important to understand that neither 
Central European nor Balkan Locarno – 
had they been materialised – could have 
been a true replica of the original agree-
ment between Germany and France 
for the simple reason that there was no 
power willing to act as a guarantor of a 
potential pact in the same way that Brit-
ain and Italy had done in Western Eu-
rope. In this case, a Locarno-like pact 
would be reduced to arbitration treaties 
on the pattern of those concluded by 
Germany, on the one hand, and Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, on the other. Yet, 
Hungary was opposed even to that as 
such arrangement could have been in-
terpreted as a tacit acquiescence in the 
terms of the Trianon Treaty. The Little 
Entente countries were also suspicious, 
so chances were slim that the British 
initiative could bear any fruit. Hornyák 
seems to suggest that Britain and Italy 
acted in agreement although he clearly 
points out that the latter country was 
solely interested in establishing its own 
7 For a full account of the British role see 
Dragan Bakić, “’Must Will Peace’: the Brit-
ish Brokering of ‘Central European’ and 
‘Balkan Locarno’, 1925–1929”, Journal of 
Contemporary History 48:1 ( Jan. 2013), 
24–56.
sphere of influence in the region and ex-
cluding France. That was certainly not 
the case. Chamberlain co-ordinated his 
efforts with Aristide Briand of France 
and Mussolini avoided their repeated 
invitations for co-operation. Neverthe-
less, the British Secretary of State did 
not lose hope that Italy would be finally 
induced to promote British plans and 
he remained extremely lenient towards 
the Duce. He was proven wrong and 
therefore a united front of Great Powers 
that could only have roped the smaller 
Danubian countries into making at least 
arbitration agreements never took shape. 
Without it and without good will among 
the potential signatories, a Locarno-
modelled treaty was just a pipe dream. 
It is only against this international back-
ground that it is possible to comprehend 
the – inevitable – failure of Chamber-
lain’s noble initiative. 
The concluding chapters detailing the 
final break-down of all attempts to reach 
a Yugo-Hungarian agreement are of par-
ticular interest as they clearly demonstrate 
that Mussolini’s disruptive influence 
was a decisive factor in this matter. He 
was intent on isolating Yugoslavia, while 
Bethlen considered, not without founda-
tion, to have achieved a major diplomatic 
success by concluding a pact of friendship 
with one of the Great Powers. Their pact 
was also a harbinger of militaristic plans 
hatched by both countries: Mussolini 
promised Hungary a military loan and 
the weapons captured in the war from the 
Habsburg Monarchy as well as full dip-
lomatic support to Budapest at the time 
of its showdown with Czechoslovakia (p. 
279). Another unpublished study based 
on Italian primary sources claims that the 
details of this arms smuggling into Hun-
gary as well as the training of Hungarian 
pilots in Italy and the purchase of three 
hundred aircraft in contravention of the 
Trianon Treaty were worked out during 
the visit to Rome of Bethlen’s personal 
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emissaries in July 1927.8 Hornyák does 
not add any new information on this clan-
destine military co-operation. Perhaps 
Hungarian records have not survived, if 
they existed at all.
There are some minor deficiencies 
that should also be pointed out. Serbian 
Colonel who negotiated armistice with 
the Hungarian delegation in early No-
vember 1918 was Danilo, and not Dan-
iel, Kalafatović (p. 285, n. 5). The Politika 
and Tribuna were government-controlled 
newspapers and not parties (pp. 104 and 
326, n. 16 respectively). VMRO stands 
for the Internal Macedonian Revolution-
ary Organisation and not Macedonian 
Liberation Organisation (p. 146). Miles 
Lampson was Head of the Central De-
partment of the British Foreign Office, 
not a “deputy foreign minister” or an “un-
8 Vera Jelinek, “The Hungarian Factor in 
Italian Foreign Policy, 1918–1927” (unpub-
lished PhD thesis, New York University, 
1977), pp. 319–320.
dersecretary of state” (pp. 220 and 240 
respectively).
In conclusion, Hornyák has pro-
duced the most comprehensive study on 
the subject of Yugo-Hungarian relations 
in the first decade after the Great War 
which will serve as a sound foundation for 
international historians interested in the 
Danube region. It is rather unfortunate 
that his diligent work is seriously marred 
by poor English translation which often 
makes it difficult to follow the text.9 There 
are also a number of typographic errors 
(for instance, Vešnić instead of Vesnić). 
The worst example of an inadequate 
proof-reading is no doubt the disparity in 
a few chapters between the actual num-
ber of references in the main body of texts 
and the endnotes listed.
9 Originally published as Magyar-jugoszláv 
diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1918–1927 (Forum, 
2004).
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The first book forms part of the Makers 
of the Modern World: The Peace Conferences 
of 1919–23 and Their Aftermath series 
edited by Professor Alan Sharp, which 
brings new insights into the proceedings 
and legacy of the Paris Peace Conference 
through biographies of the most promi-
nent participants. Dejan Djokić has con-
tributed parallel biographies of two lead-
ing members of the Yugoslav delegation, 
Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić. The for-
mer was a long-serving Prime Minister of 
Serbia and the latter a distinguished Croat 
politician who vigorously campaigned for 
a Yugoslav union during the First World 
War as the head of the London-based 
Yugoslav committee, a body composed of 
Croat, Serb and Slovene exiles from the 
Habsburg Monarchy. In drawing atten-
tion to differences between the two men, 
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